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Constitutionalism from the Top Down
Abstract
Dialogue theory regards judicial interpretation of the Charter as authoritative, and, as a result, denies that
continuing disagreement with the courts is legitimate. There is little scope, in other words, for dialogue with
the courts in any meaningful sense. The Charter is best understood as establishing strong-form judicial review
rather than weak, and legislatures have only as much room to respond to judicial decisions as the courts are
prepared to allow.
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Dialogue theory regards judicial interpretation of the
Charter as authoritative, and, as a result, denies that
continuing disagreement with the courts is legitimate.
There is little scope, in other words, for dialogue with
the courts in any meaningful sense. The Charter is best
understood as establishing strong-form judicial review
rather than weak, and legislatures have only as much
room to Yespond to judicial decisions as the courts are
prepared to allow.
Selon la th~orie du dialogue, l'interpr~tation judiciaire
de Ia Charte fait autorit6, et conteste donc qu'un
d~saccord permanent avec les tribunaux soit lgitime.
En d'autres termes, il y a peu de place pour un
dialogue avec les tribunaux, qui soit rdfl~chi. La Charte
est comprise comme 6tablissant une revision judiciaire
sous une forme forte plut6t que faible. Pour r~pondre
aux decisions judiciaires, les legislatures disposent
uniquement de la libert6 que les tribunaux sont prets
ceder.
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Dialogue theory has been enormously influential in defending
the practice of judicial review under the Charter' It has done so,
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however, not by establishing the merits of judicial review, but instead by
downplaying the significance of judicial power. Dialogue theory says
that you can have your cake and eat it too: judges can strike down laws
passed by elected legislatures with no loss to democracy, since it is
usually possible for new legislation to be passed that accomplishes the
same purpose.
With characteristic modesty, Peter Hogg, Allison A. Bushell
Thornton, and Wade K. Wright ("the authors") write that they "did not
anticipate that [their] observations of the dialogue phenomenon would
be of any interest to judges,"' but they were bound to be. After all, in
their original article Hogg and Bushell announced that dialogue theory
was a complete answer to the anti-majoritarian objection to judicial
review.3 This was a godsend for a judiciary concerned with complaints
about judicial power, and it is no wonder that the Supreme Court of
Canada embraced the theory.
The authors acknowledge that "Charter Dialogue" went too far
in claiming to have resolved the anti-majoritarian difficulty,4 but the
core finding of "Charter Dialogue"-that judicial decisions usually leave
room for a legislative response, and usually receive one-remains
intact.5 How significant is this? In my view, it is less significant than has
been supposed. In particular, the existence of legislative sequels does
not mean that Canada has a weak form of judicial review. The basic
premise underlying the authors' analysis-the notion that the judiciary is
the authoritative interpreter of the Charter-precludes any interaction
between the legislature and the judiciary that can meaningfully be called
' Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter.
2 Peter Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, "Charter Dialogue
Revisited-Or 'Much Ado about Metaphors"' (2007T45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1 at 7.
3 "[T]he critique of the Charterbased on democratic legitimacy cannot be sustained." Peter
W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, "The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or
Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All)" (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75
at 105 ["Charter Dialogue"].
' They state: "We perhaps went too far in suggesting that our study was 'an answer' to the
anti-majoritarian objection to judicial review, but the findings certainly made the anti-majoritarian
objection difficult to sustain" [footnotes omitted]. Supra note 2 at 4. Hogg acknowledged as much
in "Discovering Dialogue" in Grant Huscroft & Ian Brodie, eds., Constitutionalism in the Charter
Era (Toronto: LexisNexis-Butterworths, 2004) 3 at 5; (2004) 23 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 3 at 5.
5 Supra note 2 at 53.
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dialogue. Canada has strong-form judicial review and the authors are
wrong to suggest otherwise.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIALOGUE
PHENOMENON
Let me begin with the core finding from "Charter Dialogue."
There is no doubt that a legislative response of some sort usually follows
a judicial decision to strike down legislation. But this should come as no
surprise; a decision not to pass replacement legislation would suggest
that there was no good reason for the passage of the legislation in the
first place. Not only is the decision to pass replacement legislation not
unusual, the phenomenon of legislative sequels is not unique to Canada.
They occur in the United States, despite the features of the U.S. Bill of
Rights6 that lead the authors to characterize it as establishing strong-
form judicial review.7
The important question is not the frequency of legislative
sequels, but rather the circumstances in which they occur-and in which
they do not. The authors consider disparate cases in aggregate, and
conclude: "the Charter decisions of Canadian Courts usually operate at
the margins of legislative policy, affecting issues of process,
enforcement, and standards... ."' But this point turns out to be telling in
a different way. The phenomenon identified by the authors is, for the
most part, limited to cases in which the disagreement between the
legislature and the court centres on legislative means to particular
ends-questions that must be resolved under section 1. Different means
may well resolve a majority of these cases, but they will not resolve all of
them. Indeed, there will be cases in which courts will not countenance
the establishment of any limits on a right.9 There will also be cases in
6 U.S. Const. amends. I-X [U.S. Bill of Rights].
' See e.g. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Democratic Constitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004). See also the discussion of examples in Louis Fisher, Constitutional
Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
8 Supra note 2 at 39.
9 See e.g. Sauv v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 517. Writing for the
majority, McLachlin C.J.C. suggests that it should be more difficult to establish limits on rights not
subject to the notwithstanding clause (at 536-37). Gonthier J. contests this in his dissenting opinion
(at 571). In any case, it is clear that it is more difficult to limit some rights than others. In some
cases this is because section 1 considerations are implicit in the relevant right or freedom, such that
there is little for section 1 to do after the right or freedom has been defined. Section 7 is a good
2007]
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which the disagreement concerns the interpretation of the Charter
itself-cases in which the legislature and the court disagree about the.
meaning of particular Charter rights and freedoms rather than the
justifiability of particular limits on them. These are the cases that must
be analyzed in order to understand the impact of judicial review on the
democratic process."t
II. IS JUDICIAL REVIEW DEMOCRATIC?
The authors regard the debate about judicial review as academic
because the constitution authorizes Canadian judges to perform their
adjudicative role. "[I]f that role is 'undemocratic,"' they write, "there is
little judges can do about it."'"
This response is inadequate because the constitutional
authorization of judicial review is not in issue. Plainly, the constitution
authorizes the courts to engage in judicial review of legislation under the
Charter and was intended to do so. This says nothing, however, about
how judges should go about the practice of judicial review in particular
cases-that is, how they should exercise the power the constitution gives
them. There are few, if any, cases in which inconsistency with the
Charter is self-evident. The Charter is set out in vague terms, and the
courts must give meaning to concepts like freedom of expression,
equality, fundamental justice, and so on, in order to apply it. Hogg and
Bushell acknowledged this in their original article, and were sanguine
about the consequence. Judges, they wrote, "have a great deal of
discretion in 'interpreting' the law of the constitution, and the process of
interpretation inevitably remakes the constitution into the likeness
favoured by the judges."'2
example. Nevertheless, the Court continues to insist that all rights are subject to reasonable limits.
See R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at 95.
'o It is important to add that the impact of judicial review cannot be assessed simply by the
study of judicial decisions and legislative sequels in any event. The influence of particular judicial
decisions extends beyond the context of the impugned legislation. Judicial decisions influence
future legislative agendas in various ways that cannot be measured empirically. They may dissuade
governments from introducing legislation, for example, or may determine the policy choices made
and hence the shape of legislation that is promulgated. See the discussion in Part V, below.
"Supra note 2 at 8.
1Supra note 3 at 77.
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There is a tendency to celebrate broad and generous judicial
interpretations of rights and freedoms as though this demonstrates a
commitment to the Charter itself. But the corollary of broadly
interpreted rights is diminished scope for democratic law-making, and
this is almost always overlooked. The more generously the Court defines
a right or freedom, the more it limits the scope of legislative power, thus
requiring governments to defend inconsistency with the Charter more
often. Ultimately, constitutionality depends upon how easy or difficult
the Court chooses to make it for the government to meet the tests it has
established under section 1.
In all of this, the decision to empower the courts to conduct
judicial review under the Charter is simply beside the point. What
matters is how the power of judicial review is exercised. The approach
the Supreme Court of Canada takes to interpreting the Charter
determines the shape of our democratic constitutional order and, in
particular, how majoritarian it will be.
I emphasize this point because the Charter does not compel the
Court to adopt any particular theory of judicial review-narrow or
expansive-and dialogue theory has nothing to say about the matter.
The authors never claimed that it did. They argued, instead, that it does
not matter how expansive the Court's approach to interpretation is since
there is usually room for a legislative response to a judicial decision.
III. DOES THE CHARTER ESTABLISH WEAK-FORM
JUDICIAL REVIEW?
The observation that there is usually room for a legislative
response following a judicial decision interpreting the Charter led Hogg
and Bushell to conclude that the Charter establishes only a weak form
of judicial review. Weak is a relative term, and their purpose in using it
was to differentiate Canadian judicial review from American. The U.S.
Bill of Rights does not contain a reasonable limits clause analogous to
section 1, nor does it include a notwithstanding clause, two of the key
features of the Charter on which the authors' theory is based. The
assumption is that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are final; they
.2007]
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can be overcome only by constitutional amendment. This is the
paradigmatic case of strong-form judicial review. 3
In my view, the differences between judicial review in the United
States and Canada are not as great as is usually supposed. Both models
involve the tasks of defining rights and considering whether or not limits
on those rights are justified. Under the U.S. Bill of Rights these tasks
are collapsed into a single step, rather than treated as analytically
distinct as they are under the Charter.4 There is no question, however,
that the rights and freedoms protected by the U.S. Bill of Rights are
subject to reasonable limits, as the First Amendment freedom of speech
cases demonstrate. 5
The main difference between the U.S. Bill of Rights and the
Canadian Charter is the notwithstanding clause-section 33 of the
Charter-but this is a difference that comes to little: the
notwithstanding clause is unused, and all but unusable. Hogg and
Bushell acknowledged in 1997 that the notwithstanding clause had
become relatively unimportant, and noted the development of a political
culture resistant to its use.16 Ten years on, it is time to go further and
acknowledge that the notwithstanding clause is simply irrelevant. There
have been no significant uses of the clause outside of Quebec, nor are
there likely to be in the future. Successive prime ministers and premiers
in most provinces have disavowed its use.
Kent Roach makes this sort of argument at length. See Kent Roach, The Supreme Court
on Trial (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 29-33, 290. See also the critical reviews by Mark Tushnet,
"Judicial Activism cr Restraint in a Section 33 World" (2003) 53 U.T.L.J. 89; and James Allan,
"The Author Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks" (2003) 20 N.Z.U.L.R. 519.
Mark Tushnet puts the point this way:
[11n the United States the Supreme Court defines the rights in question by referring to
the justifications the government has for its action. Social interests are accommodated in
the process of defining constitutional rights, and no right exists to be infringed if the
government's justifications are good enough. In that sense only are rights in the United
States absolute: Because government justifications have been taken into account at step
one, nothing remains to be done by taking a second step.
Tushnet, ibid. at 92 [emphasis in original].
'1 The U.S. Supreme Court's approach to the regulation of commercial law is a good
example. The test in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447
U.S. 557 (1980) is essentially the same as the general approach to limiting rights the Supreme Court
of Canada set out severalyears later in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [Oakes].
16 Supra note 3 at 83.
[VOL. 45, NO. I
2007] Constitutionalism from the Top Down 97
It makes little sense, then, to regard judicial review under the
Charter as weak-form judicial review. Canadian courts have the power
to strike down legislation, and this power can only be understood as
establishing strong-form judicial review. Canadian constitutional theory
is in denial about this, and about the extraordinary nature of this power.
We like to talk about how influential the Charter has been
internationally, but it is revealing that no similar countries have
empowered judges to do what Canadian judges can do under the
Charter. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was passed in ordinary
statute form, 17 as was the U.K. Human Rights Act"8 and, most recently,
bills of rights at the state level in Australia. 9 In all of these common law
countries, judicial power is limited to granting declarations of
inconsistency in the event that a court concludes that legislation
infringes human rights without justification. If the concept of weak-form
judicial review has any relevance, it is as a description of judicial review
under the statutory bills of rights in these countries."
Not only can the Supreme Court of Canada strike down
legislation, it has the power to make its decisions stick-to preclude any
legislative response other than enactment of the Court's decision-if it
chooses to do so. It can do this, for example, by holding that legislation
pursues an end that is not sufficiently important to warrant the
establishment of any limit on rights, thus failing at the pressing and
substantial objective branch of the Oakes test.2' The Court does not
17 1990 (N.Z.), 1990/109. See generally Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican &
Richard Mahoney, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003).
'8 1998(U.K.), 1998, c. 42 [U.K. Human Rights Acd.
'9 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic.). The Australian Capital
Territory also has a bill of rights, the Human Rights Act 2004 (A.C.T.), which denies judges the
authority to strike down legislation.
20 Even here, the term may be misleading. Where judges are limited to the power to issue
declarations of inconsistency or incompatibility with a bill of rights, the important question is the
extent to which such declarations are heeded by the legislature. Experience under the U.K. Human
Rights Act, supra note 18, to this point demonstrates that declarations are invariably accepted by
the legislature. See Francesca Klug & Keir Starmer, "Standing Back for the Human Rights Act:
How Effective Is It Five Years On?" [2005] P.L. 716 at 721. This being so, the distinction between
strong and weak-form judicial review collapses: all judicial review can be characterized as strong-
form. An analogous point can be made about the Supreme Court of Canada's advisory power on
reference questions.
21 Oakes, supra note 15.
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often do this, of course, but the point is that it can.22 Another way in
which the Court can make its decisions stick is to refuse to suspend a
declaration of unconstitutionality.23 This establishes a new status quo
that cannot be unwound, even in theory, since the notwithstanding
clause can only be applied prospectively.24 Beyond this, the Court can
structure its section 1 analysis in such a way as to dictate the terms
pursuant to which a legislative response will be permitted. These are just
some of the tools at the Court's disposal. A court with this sort of
discretionary power is not engaged in weak-form judicial review in any
meaningful sense.
IV. THE IMPACT OF A DECISION TO STRIKE DOWN
LEGISLATION
The authors note that the purpose of Hogg and Bushell's article
was to "challenge the anti-majoritarian objection to the legitimacy of
judicial review" under the Charter They acknowledge that dialogue
theory is not a complete answer to this objection, as was claimed in
1997, but maintain that it makes the objection more difficult to sustain.26
Again, I think that the numbers do not tell the full story. To say
that it is usually possible for legislatures to respond to judicial decisions
by passing new legislation is to understate the impact of a decision that
strikes down legislation. The authors convey the impression that it is
easy to legislate, but it is not. Although a simple majority in the
legislature suffices to pass legislation, judicial decisions interpreting the
Charter are never politically neutral in their effect. They create powerful
incentives and disincentives to political action, and no account of
judicial review is complete without taking this into account. A
government that wishes to pass replacement legislation must revisit a
2 2Hogg and Bushell acknowledged this. Supra note 3 at 93-95.
' Even the decisions of lower courts can have this effect. The Ontario Court of Appeal's
decision not to suspend the declaration of unconstitutionality in Halpern v. Canada (A.G.) (2003),
65 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.) resulted in same-sex marriages occurring immediately. See Grant Huscroft,
"Thank God We're Here: Judicial Exclusivity in Interpreting the Charter and its Consequences"
(2004) 25 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 241; Grant Huscroft, "Political Litigation and the Role of the Court"
(2006) 34 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 35 [Huscroft, "Political Litigation"].
24Ford v. Ouebec (A. G.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
5 Supra note 2 at 2.
26 Ibid. at 4.
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political problem that had been regarded as settled. The price of doing
so may be high-so high, in fact, that as a practical matter it cannot be
paid. Even if a government favours the passage of replacement
legislation, there are significant opportunity costs involved. Something
else on the government's agenda must be delayed or set aside in order
to make room for the replacement legislation. Government time,
energy, and political capital must be expended. Even a government
committed to legislating may find it impossible to do so. A decision to
strike down legislation under the Charter may unravel political
compromises that cannot be recreated in new and different
circumstances.
R. v. Morgentaler 7 is a prime example. The Court's decision
striking down the therapeutic abortion law left room for new legislation
and the government had the will to act, but the Court's decision had so
altered the political landscape that passage of new legislation to regulate
abortion proved impossible. The authors acknowledge the political force
of judicial decisions, but ask "whether it is a bad thing that some judicial
decisions striking down legislation for unjustifiably infringing a Charter
right or freedom bring about a form of legislative inertia that hinders
the ability of legislatures to respond.""8
This is a rhetorical question for the authors, but in my view there
is an answer. Legislative inertia in the face of a judicial decision is a bad
thing if the Court's interpretation of the Charter is worse than the
legislature's, and that is always a real possibility. The authors
acknowledge that the Court's decisions may be wrong, but they insist
that the paramount consideration is the finality of judicial decisions as a
legal matter, and, as a result, are unconcerned with the impact of
judicial decisions on the political process.
V. INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY AND THE LEGITIMACY
OF DISAGREEMENT
The authors argue that judicial interpretation of the Charter is
authoritative. They do not concede a judicial monopoly on
correctness-they acknowledge that incorrect decisions may be made
from time to time. They insist, however, that there is-and must be-a
27[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
1 Supra note 2 at 41.
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judicial monopoly on finality.29 Their position is, in essence, captured in
Justice Robert H. Jackson's famous aphorism about the U.S. Supreme
Court: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible
only because we are final."3
The authors accept that the executive and legislatures have the
authority to interpret the Charter, but insist that their ability to act is
circumscribed by the case law:
[W]here the interpretive task takes place against the backdrop of a prior relevant judicial
decision, the legislature and the executive may not act on an interpretation of the
Charterwhich conflicts with an interpretation provided by the courts. Why? Because, in
doing so, they would be doing (or refraining from doing) something that the courts have
said would unjustifiably infringe the Charter, and under our system of constitutional
democracy, that is impermissible.3
The authors acknowledge only two exceptions. First, the
executive and legislature may act on conflicting interpretations of the
Charter where there is a material change in circumstances or new
evidence is discovered, and, as a result, it is plausible to believe that a
measure may now be understood as constituting a reasonable limit on a
Charter right. Secondly, the legislature may act on a conflicting
interpretation of the Charterby invoking the notwithstanding clause.
From what I can see, this is a counsel of duty to the Court and its
decisions rather than the Charter and its provisions, something neither
required by the constitution nor desirable in normative terms. To say
that the Court's decisions are final is to bind future legislatures to the
opinion of passing majorities of the Court. Once it is acknowledged that
decisions of the Court may be wrong, it is incumbent upon the authors
to make the case for the requirement that the other branches of
government must follow the Court's decisions, but they fail to do so.
They assert that the decisions of the executive and legislature have no
claim to finality, but this is a response to an argument that no one
makes. The question is not whether or not the executive and legislature
may make final decisions, but instead whether or not the executive and
legislature must accept the finality of judicial interpretations of the
Charter.
29 Ibid. at 32.
"°Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) at 540.
31 Supra note 2 at 33.
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Why should the meaning of the Charter become fixed once a
majority of the Court has spoken? Any meaningful conception of the
rule of law requires the outcome in particular cases to be accepted and
enforced by the government, but what claim do judicial interpretations
of the Charter have beyond this?
The question is important in Canada because the Court does
more than simply decide cases brought before it. The Court may, for
example, decide to hear moot cases and hypothetical disputes; it may
enter the fray before a matter is ripe for resolution; and it may engage in
lengthy obiter discussions if it thinks it important to do so.32 From the
Court's perspective, all of these things count as law. Indeed, sometimes
the Court is so immodest as to assert that far-reaching decisions are
required, as though chaos would ensue in the absence of judicial
direction as to the meaning of the Charter. The Court is free to do all of
this, of course, however unwise it may be. The .question is: why should
the other branches of government be bound to act in accordance with
the Court's interpretation of the Charte?
The government can, of course, be counted on to be respectful
of the Court's interpretation of the Charter. Few governments have the
stature to pick a fight with the Court, let alone win one. But there
should be no doubt that it is appropriate for the government to disagree
with the Court's interpretation of the Charter, and to act accordingly.
The executive and the legislature are duty bound to act in accordance
with the constitution, and the constitution is not simply whatever the
Court says it is.
The true position is more nuanced than the authors suggest. The
* law of the Charter, as with the law of the constitution generally, is not
the product of judicial declaration or fiat; the law of the Charter
develops with the input of all of the branches of government on an
ongoing basis. Other branches of government may accept the judiciary's
interpretation of the Charter, but they are under no obligation to do so.
On the contrary, as I argue below, the executive and the legislature can
and should challenge the Court's interpretation of the Charter
whenever they think the Court has erred.
J The Court's conduct in reference cases is particularly problematic. It may answer
questions it has not been asked-even questions that are political rather than legal-while refusing
to answer legal questions that governments have the right to ask. See Huscroft, "Political
Litigation," supra note 23.
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VI. THE SECOND LOOK CASES
On the authors' account, there should not be any "second look"
cases-cases in which the Court is asked to review the constitutionality
of legislation enacted to replace a law struck down in a previous Charter
case-that involve disagreement about the interpretation of Charter
rights and freedoms. Judicial interpretation of the Charter is
authoritative, according to the authors, and legislatures must legislate in
accordance with it:
[I]f the second law has been enacted on the premise of a legislative disagreement with
the court's interpretation of a Charter right or freedom (as opposed to a more
convincing demonstration of a section 1 justification), then the second look case will
have to be decided against the legislation, unless a notwithstanding clause has been
used.
33
Thus, R. v. Mills34 proves to be a difficult case for the authors.
Mills concerned the constitutionality of a legislative scheme that
overturned a common law right to the production of records in sexual
assault cases, a right that' had been established in a 5:4 decision in R. v.
O'Connor.35 The legislation impugned in Mills was based on a different
conception of the Charter rights at stake, rather than simply a
disagreement as to the appropriate scope of a limitation under section 1.
Indeed, the legislation impugned in Mills basically enacted the
dissenting opinion from O'Connor. Nevertheless, Parliament's view was
vindicated: the Court upheld the constitutionality of the legislation by a
majority of eight to one, and invoked the dialogue concept in doing so.
The authors describe Mills as "most difficult to rationalize," and
acknowledge disagreements amongst themselves as to whether it can be
rationalized at all.36 But Mills poses no problems for me. On the
contrary, it exemplifies what I consider to be a dialogue in a meaningful
sense. Parliament's replacement legislation tested the Court's
commitment to its decision in O'Connor, and that commitment was
found wanting. That seems to me to be a good thing, especially when the
alternatives are considered.
7 Supra note 2 at 49.
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 309 [Mills].
Js[1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 [O'Connoi].
Supra note 2 at 50. Hogg recants the view, expressed in 2004, that when it comes to
second look cases, deference should be the order of the day. See ibid. at 42.
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One alternative would have been obedience to the narrow
majority decision of the Court in O'Connor, now and forever-unless
the Court later changed its mind. How this might occur is not clear, of
course, if future legislation were required to be drafted so as to respect
the Court's prior decisions. The other alternative would have been for
Parliament to do the politically impossible: to invoke the
notwithstanding clause, ensuring that the legislature's opinion would
prevail for a renewable five-year period. The authors suppose that
because the notwithstanding clause exists, it is the only means of
expressing disagreement with judicial interpretations of the Charter.37
The result is ironic: a clause designed to ensure that legislatures
have the power to overturn the decisions of the courts turns out to
preclude them from doing anything shortof overturning those decisions.
All things considered, we might be better off if the notwithstanding
clause had not been included in the Charter.
VII. CONCLUSION
The authors consider the idea that courts and legislatures
actually "talk" with each other ridiculous,38 and I agree. They think that
the dialogue metaphor does not matter much in the scheme of things,
however, and I disagree. The name they gave to the phenomenon of the
legislative sequel is the thing that makes it so useful for the Court. To
describe the relationship between the legislature and the Court as a
dialogue is to soft-peddle the impact of judicial power on the democratic
political processes.
As I have argued, Canada has strong-form judicial review. It
does not follow, however, that the role of the executive and the
legislature is to submit to the Court's will. On the contrary, if the
Charter is to be more than a top-down instrument, the other branches
of government must challenge the Court's interpretation of the Charter
from time to time. Judicial decisions matter, but the constitution
What then is the role of the notwithstanding clause? It is on my account a fail-safe-a
last resort where the Court is committed to an interpretation of the Charter that the legislature
cannot accept. It is not something that precludes the legislature from testing the Court's
commitment to an interpretation in the first place.
3 8 Supra note 2 at 26.
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requires neither judicial finality nor judicial exclusivity in interpreting
the Charter.
